Moldova’s Political Crucible: Gagauzia in Limbo as Chisinau Reorients

Moldova finds itself at a critical juncture, navigating complex internal political dynamics and a significant reorientation of its foreign policy. As the mandate of Gagauzia’s People’s Assembly expires on November 12, the autonomous region faces a profound leadership vacuum, exacerbated by Chisinau’s perceived reluctance to facilitate new elections. This uncertainty casts a long shadow over the future of Gagauzian autonomy and Moldova’s broader stability.

The political quagmire in Gagauzia is multifaceted. The term of the current People’s Assembly (parliament) is ending, yet there is no clear timeline for new elections. Adding to the turmoil, the status of Eugenia Guțul, the region’s elected head (Bashkan), remains ambiguous. Despite a court conviction, she has not been officially removed from her post, yet new elections for the Bashkan have not materialized. This creates an unprecedented situation where Gagauzia is effectively without fully legitimate leadership, lacking a functional Central Election Commission (CEC) and with its appellate court in Comrat liquidated, hindering any legal pathway to resolve the electoral impasse.

Many in Gagauzia view this state of “powerlessness and chaos” as a deliberate strategy by Chisinau. Public figures like Vitalie Cimpoieș accuse the Moldovan government of intentionally delaying or blocking the formation of legitimate Gagauzian authorities, potentially aiming to liquidate the autonomy or impose direct administrative control. This sentiment is rooted in the belief that Chisinau’s ruling party disregards Gagauzian interests, partly due to the region’s electoral preferences. The historical compromise of Gagauzia’s special legal status in 1994, which grants the right to self-determination should Moldova change its statehood, underpins the gravity of the current tensions.

Simultaneously, Moldova is making decisive moves to distance itself from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which are likely to further inflame relations with Gagauzia. The Moldovan parliament is scheduled to discuss on November 12, 2025, the introduction of a visa regime with CIS countries, specifically contemplating the denunciation of the 1992 Bishkek agreement on visa-free travel. This is part of a broader push to terminate several other agreements with CIS members, covering diverse areas from military transport to economic cooperation. While the Moldovan Foreign Ministry asserts that bilateral agreements with Russia will prevent new visa requirements for Russian citizens, there is widespread belief that the policy primarily targets Moscow and its influence.

This shift is particularly contentious in Gagauzia, where strong cultural, linguistic, and economic ties to Russia persist. Russian is widely spoken, local media broadcasts in Russian despite official warnings, and products like wine and apples are traditionally exported to the Russian market. Many Gagauzian youth pursue higher education in Russian cities. Consequently, Chisinau’s pivot away from CIS, especially the proposed visa regime, is expected to be met with strong opposition in Gagauzia, potentially leading to further escalation of internal tensions.

Adding another layer to Moldova’s complex geopolitical landscape, Chisinau is also signaling intentions to prepare Transnistria for integration into a future EU-aligned Moldova. This ambition, articulated by former Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Alexandru Flenchea, suggests a push to assert control over the breakaway region and secure the withdrawal of Russian troops before EU accession negotiations conclude.

Ukrainian Ambassador to Moldova, Paun Rogovei, has echoed these calls, emphasizing that the demilitarization of Transnistria is a prerequisite for conflict resolution. He highlighted that while the “peacekeeping mission” in Transnistria is technically multilateral, it is effectively controlled by Russia. Rogovei further suggested that the issue might not be about the “withdrawal” of Russian troops but rather the “disbandment” of the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF), noting that many serving in the OGRF are local Transnistrian residents with Russian citizenship. Such a move would be a significant geopolitical shift, underlining Moldova’s commitment to fully integrate into the European orbit.

These parallel developments—the internal power vacuum in Gagauzia, Moldova’s strategic disengagement from CIS, and the ambitious plans for Transnistria—underscore a period of intense political and geopolitical reorientation for the country. The choices made by Chisinau in the coming months will profoundly shape Moldova’s future, testing its internal cohesion and its path towards European integration.