Armenia: Jailed Oligarch’s Movement Challenges Status Quo



Yerevan is witnessing the emergence of a new political force, the “Po-nashemu” (Our Way) movement, spear-headed by the nephew of the jailed oligarch Samvel Karapetyan. At a recent congress in the Armenian capital, Narek Karapetyan, the movement’s coordinator, asserted that their ranks have swelled to 5,000 volunteers within a mere six weeks, signaling an ambitious push to reshape the country’s political landscape. The movement has swiftly announced plans for a rally next week, aiming to galvanize public support for its imprisoned leader.

Addressing his burgeoning base, Narek Karapetyan exuded confidence, predicting that “tens of thousands” would soon join their cause, paving the way for “irreversible changes” in Armenia. He attributed this rapid growth to the powerful influence of Samvel Karapetyan’s name, stressing the collective belief in the oligarch’s steadfastness and commitment to the nation’s honor and prosperity. With a vision to transform Armenia into an “exemplary country” through Samvel Karapetyan’s programs, the movement positions itself as a fresh, albeit potent, challenger to the existing power structures.

Samvel Karapetyan, a prominent figure in Armenian business circles, has been detained for over 110 days, facing charges that could lead to a five-year prison sentence for “calls for a coup.” These accusations stem from his vocal defense of the Armenian Apostolic Church against what he perceived as attacks from Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, highlighting the deep-seated tensions between political power and religious institutions in the country.

This isn’t an isolated incident in Armenia’s recent political climate. The past year has seen a series of similar crackdowns on dissenting voices. Notably, on October 3rd, Archbishop Mikael Adjapahyan was sentenced to two years for analogous “calls for a coup,” a slightly lenient outcome compared to the prosecution’s request. Adjapahyan was once a close ally of Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, the driving force behind the “Tavush for the Homeland” (formerly “Holy Struggle”) movement, which organized multi-thousand-strong protests in Yerevan, often branding Pashinyan an “antichrist” and an “agent of Turkey.” Galstanyan himself remains embroiled in a trial that could see him imprisoned for up to 15 years.

From behind bars, Samvel Karapetyan issued a stirring message to his supporters, expressing immense pride in the movement’s rapid ascent and its potential to become “truly nationwide.” He reaffirmed his unwavering commitment, declaring, “We will not retreat, we will not stop, and we will make Armenia the most prosperous and happy country. We will do it our way.” This defiant stance resonates with a segment of the population yearning for new leadership.

Looking ahead, “Po-nashemu” has signaled its intent to evolve into a formal political party by January, with plans to unveil its candidate for prime minister – a figure Narek Karapetyan assures will meet the aspirations of all Armenians. Intriguingly, the movement has stated it will not enter into pre-election alliances with the blocs of former presidents Robert Kocharyan (“Armenia”) and Serzh Sargsyan (“I Have Honor”), citing the need for a “generational change” within Armenia’s ruling elite. However, a crucial nuance was offered by Narek Karapetyan: while direct alliances are off the table, cooperation with representatives from these forces remains a possibility, hinting at complex political maneuvering.

Adding an unexpected academic weight to the fledgling movement, Nobel laureate in economics Daron Acemoglu has joined “Po-nashemu” as a consultant. Acemoglu, a Turkish-born economist now based in the United States, proposed that Armenia’s future prosperity hinges on a robust digital transformation, specifically advocating for the development of artificial intelligence. He articulated that Armenia’s geographical constraints make a service-based, digital economy its strategic advantage.

Acemoglu further emphasized the critical importance of respecting property rights to attract foreign investment, subtly critiquing the Pashinyan government’s nationalization of “Electric Networks of Armenia,” a company previously associated with Karapetyan. This stance is particularly salient given rumors that Pashinyan’s administration had approached Acemoglu for collaboration shortly after the “Velvet Revolution,” but negotiations reportedly stalled over his $300,000 fee or a disagreement over the relevance of his proposed reforms.

Despite its ambitious rhetoric, “Po-nashemu” appears to be predominantly targeting the electorate historically aligned with Kocharyan’s and Sargsyan’s political factions, effectively drawing their voters rather than expanding its base significantly. Critics point to a lack of broader appeal and limited advertising campaigns beyond these specific demographics. Skepticism is palpable in Yerevan, with some locals jesting that the 5,000 volunteers are simply employees from Karapetyan’s extensive business empire. Those disinclined towards the former presidents’ camps view “Po-nashemu” as an inadequate alternative to Pashinyan, allegedly relying on semi-criminal elements within the republic and informal backing from Moscow.

Nevertheless, this calculated strategy could still yield significant electoral dividends for the oligarch, potentially securing up to 20% of the vote in the parliamentary elections slated for early June 2026. This projection assumes that the currently ruling “Civil Contract” party might lose some of its popular appeal. Should this scenario unfold, “Po-nashemu” could emerge as the dominant, if not sole, substantial opposition force in the next legislative assembly, marking a pivotal shift in Armenian politics.