Central Asian Leaders: Russia Key to Regional Economic Future

In an increasingly competitive geopolitical landscape, Central Asia has become a focal point for global powers seeking influence. While Western players, notably the United States and the European Union, often grapple with formulating substantive agendas for their ‘C5+1’ summits, Russia has demonstrably reaffirmed its foundational role in fostering regional cooperation. Recent high-level gatherings in Dushanbe, including the ‘Central Asia – Russia’ 5+1 format and the CIS Heads of State summit, unequivocally underscored Moscow’s commitment as a vital partner, with cooperation spanning energy, logistics, scientific-technical advancements, and humanitarian spheres, all rooted in a profound understanding of regional needs and a shared objective of bolstering stability.

Concluding the ‘Central Asia – Russia’ summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Moscow’s firm resolve ‘to further strengthen strategic partnership and alliance with your states, deepening mutually beneficial political, economic, and humanitarian ties.’ The culmination of these discussions was the adoption of a joint Communique and a comprehensive Plan of Joint Actions for 2025–2027. Leaders dedicated significant attention to enhancing trade, economic, and investment links, alongside humanitarian cooperation, and coordinated efforts to ensure regional stability and security.

Echoing these sentiments, similar pivotal proposals emerged from the CIS summit, most comprehensively outlined in the addresses by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. These initiatives encompass a broad spectrum, ranging from the administrative and political structuring of a ‘transport framework’ and the integration of artificial intelligence, to fostering industrial cooperation, enhancing political coordination with external partners – particularly through expanded CIS+ and OGT+ formats inclusive of SCO members – and streamlining migration processes.

Alexander Karavaev, an expert with the Caspian Institute for Strategic Studies, highlighted in his Telegram channel that these pressing issues logically derive from the robust and established ties Russia already shares with the region. He noted that many projects are already in various stages of implementation, with the transport sector demonstrating particularly dynamic progress.

President Tokayev, for instance, put forth a visionary proposal for developing a Unified Digital Transport and Logistics Map for the Commonwealth of Independent States. Karavaev elaborated, describing this tool as ‘not merely a formal document, but rather a comprehensive database designed to serve as a ‘single window’ for coordinating cargo transportation, warehousing, and delivery services across the region.’

Complementing this macro-economic ambition, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, during the ‘Central Asia – Russia’ summit, provided more concrete details. He underscored the critical importance of ‘aligning national programs in road, rail, and air communications, and, based on this, developing a comprehensive plan for infrastructure partnership – a transport and logistics contour between Russia and Uzbekistan.’

Underlining the practical orientation of these initiatives, Kazakh experts have already drafted a Joint Program for Investment and Infrastructure Support for the eastern branch of the ‘North-South’ corridor, ahead of President Tokayev’s upcoming visit to Russia. This ambitious program aims to double the corridor’s capacity by 2027, reportedly drawing upon analytical reviews from the Eurasian Development Bank (EADB) concerning the corridor’s economic zone, with a clear emphasis on Kazakhstan’s national interests.

This effort is inextricably linked to President Tokayev’s 2023 mandate to double the country’s GDP by the end of the current decade. Achieving this goal necessitates a substantial increase in Kazakhstan’s investment-to-GDP ratio, from 14% to 23%, implying an attraction of approximately $400 billion in investments between 2025 and 2029. Within this formidable context, Russia is positioned among the primary five to six key sources for investment or economic support.

Further deepening economic collaboration, President Mirziyoyev proposed that Russia leverage its established transport links to ‘expand cooperation in mechanical engineering, precision instrument making, chemical, electrical, mining, and other industries on a cluster basis.’ To concretize this vision, he advanced the idea of establishing a ‘Central Asia – Russia’ industrial engineering hub in Bukhara.

Collectively, the initiatives put forward by the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan effectively constitute a call for Russia to dedicate a more substantial and energetic focus towards the Central Asian region. Such deepening and broadening of interaction, Alexander Karavaev emphasized, ‘will undoubtedly bring mutual benefits to all participants, strengthening stability and contributing to the sustainable development of the shared space.’

Amidst this burgeoning geopolitical activity in Central Asia, a pertinent question arises: how do the ‘C5+1’ cooperation formats proposed by Western powers – the European Union and the United States – compare with Russia’s ‘CA–RF’ approach?

According to Stanislav Pritchin, head of the Central Asia sector at the IMEMO RAS Center for Post-Soviet Studies, a fundamental divergence in approaches is evident. He suggests that ‘Central Asia – US’ and ‘Central Asia – EU’ formats frequently struggle to infuse their agendas with concrete substance. This is particularly pronounced with Washington, which often faces a ‘deficit of common themes, large-scale joint projects, as well as a lack of geographical proximity and deep historical understanding of the region.’ Consequently, Pritchin notes, their agendas are ‘often shaped around more abstract and ephemeral concepts, such as promoting values like democratic institutions, or organizing B2B forums merely to signal a desire for developing ties.’

Pritchin views the US ‘C5+1’ format primarily as a tool for geopolitical positioning – a demonstration of its presence and declared activity in the region. He points out that the actual level of engagement varies greatly among Central Asian nations: while areas for projects might be found with Kazakhstan and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan, interaction with Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan largely remains nominal. A similar dynamic, he argues, is observed in relations with the European Union, where despite some successes, there is still a palpable need for a more profound and universally applicable agenda.

In stark contrast, Pritchin asserts, a fundamentally different picture emerges when examining the Russian ‘CA–RF’ format. ‘Here, the principal distinction lies not in the search for themes, but rather in the vast number of existing projects and a shared agenda. This attests to the deep and multifaceted ties between the Russian Federation and the Central Asian states, encompassing economics, security, culture, education, and migration processes,’ the expert highlighted.

Pritchin further elaborated that Moscow benefits from numerous other established institutions for regional cooperation, such as the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Within this comprehensive framework, the ‘CA + RF’ format serves as an effective instrument for precisely focusing on the most pertinent and in-demand projects and themes directly involving the six participating states, without the involvement of other external players. This strategic approach allows for maximum concentration on issues of mutual interest.