Turkic Bloc at Crossroads: Unity Tested by Geopolitical Ambitions

The recent summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in Gabala, Azerbaijan, concluded with a declaration affirming a shared commitment to economic and cultural development. Yet, beneath the surface of unity, significant divergences among member states emerged, casting a shadow over Ankara’s ambitious proposals to transform the bloc. Experts view Turkey’s push for security cooperation, including military exercises and the expansive “OTS+” initiative, potentially involving non-Turkic states like Syria, as an attempt by Ankara to unilaterally dictate the foreign policy agenda of the member nations.

Taking the helm of the OTS, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev underscored the organization’s unifying power, emphasizing shared historical, ethnic roots, and linguistic ties that bind members “as one family.” Building on this narrative, President Aliyev put forward a proposal for joint OTS military exercises on Azerbaijani soil in 2026. He highlighted Azerbaijan’s extensive experience, citing more than 25 bilateral and multinational military drills conducted with Turkey over the past year, as proof of his nation’s readiness to host such an event.

However, this call for collective military drills failed to garner a public endorsement from other OTS leaders. Throughout the summit’s sessions, each head of state seemed intent on advancing their distinct national agendas and core state interests. Interestingly, the broader “OTS+” initiative, aimed at expanding cooperation beyond exclusively Turkic-speaking countries, received a more positive reception, seen as a practical mechanism to engage new partners.

For instance, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev focused on concrete proposals, suggesting the establishment of a Cybersecurity Council and a Center for Digital Innovations. He also emphasized the critical importance of developing large-scale trade and economic projects and bolstering logistics within the OTS framework. Tokayev further lauded the unique role and potential of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in fostering stability, security, and peace across the Turkic states’ sphere of influence. Kazakh political analyst Daniyar Ashimbaev observed that Astana displayed little interest in the “military-political prospects” of the OTS or Turkish President Erdogan’s recurring call for a common Turkic alphabet and accelerated creation of a “large linguistic model for the Turkic language.” Ashimbaev noted in his Telegram channel that “Tokayev reaffirmed Kazakhstan’s commitment to economic, humanitarian, and cultural cooperation, while avoiding involvement in foreign geopolitical games and hierarchical relations.”

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, meanwhile, voiced profound concern over the volatile situations in the Middle East, Ukraine, and Afghanistan, alongside the “problems of the Iranian nuclear program.” He welcomed “new plans by leading global powers to establish a just world order, ensure mutual trust and security,” and proposed hosting the first joint meeting of OTS foreign ministers and intelligence chiefs in Samarkand to forge common approaches to regional and global security issues. Mirziyoyev also championed the creation of a Turkic Industrial Alliance and the strengthening of economic collaboration, highlighting how connecting the Middle Corridor with the planned China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway and the prospective Trans-Afghan Corridor could create a “multi-sectoral strategic system of main roads” in the region.

Derya Karaev, a Turkmen political scientist, offered a pointed critique, telling *NG* that “OTS, like any synthetic and ideological construct, requires constant injection of new meanings and narratives that, on the one hand, conform to the original designs but are declared as ‘development,’ and on the other hand, are intended to tighten this alliance into the Procrustean bed of pan-Turkism in a purely Turkish version. This is already creating a number of tensions that are becoming increasingly apparent from one OTS summit to the next.” Karaev explained that while initiatives for a unified Turkic alphabet, language, and history are met with varied reactions across Central Asia, such ideas are unacceptable to Turkmenistan’s authorities. He stressed that language, history, and culture form the fundamental bedrock of Turkmenistan’s state policy, where its unique “Turkic primogeniture” is elevated to an unconditional maxim. “Turkmenistan’s authorities are in no hurry to trade this for fleeting tactical alliances and are unlikely to embrace Turkic unification in the foreseeable future, despite the constant mantras about fraternal peoples and kinship,” Karaev underscored.

It was noteworthy that Turkmenistan was represented not by President Serdar Berdymukhamedov, but by his father, National Leader Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, whose visit to Gabala was swiftly followed by a trip to Paris, where he was received by President Emmanuel Macron. This diplomatic sequence, according to Karaev, sent a clear signal to Ankara. At the Gabala summit, President Erdogan merely expressed regret that Turkmenistan had not yet become a full member of the OTS, despite being “awaited there.”

Another significant point of contention within the OTS is the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Despite unprecedented pressure and against the protests of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s diplomacy, TRNC was controversially admitted as an observer to the OTS at the 2023 Samarkand summit. However, subsequent to this, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan collectively signed a joint text affirming two UN Security Council resolutions from the early 1980s (541 and 550), which deem the TRNC’s declaration of independence and “all separatist actions” legally invalid. This move effectively neutralized Ankara’s persistent efforts to legitimize TRNC through its OTS membership. Lingering questions also surround the OTS members’ intentions to unify tariff policies within the bloc, especially given that some are already members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which has its own established, albeit often debated, tariff policies. “It seems that from summit to summit, the OTS continues to produce a kind of ‘Manilovism,’ where projects and ventures increasingly claim global regionalism, while all very serious contradictions are masked by the ‘brotherly trance’ of Turkic solidarity,” Karaev concluded, referencing a character from Nikolai Gogol known for empty fantasies.

Alexander Kobrinsky, Director of the Agency for Ethno-National Strategies, drew a parallel between the OTS and an embryonic European Union in Central Asia. He noted that the EU, initially conceived with purely economic objectives, is now nearing its transformation into a military bloc. “Similarly, the OTS appears to be following this trajectory, harboring hidden objectives,” Kobrinsky stated. He traced the origins of the unification idea from London, through Ankara, to Central Asia, where Nursultan Nazarbayev initially proposed an economic union within a Turkic framework, which attracted other heads of state. “However, the true goal of the OTS is different: it aims to dismantle the CSTO and sideline regional leaders by transferring their functions to supranational officials, akin to the EU model,” Kobrinsky told *NG*. “To achieve this, it is necessary not only to engage in economics but also to actively develop military potential. Therefore, the OTS will persistently transform primarily into a military alliance of Turkic states, and only then into everything else. The inevitable question arises: against whom will this military alliance be directed?”

In this context, the expert added, the lack of response to President Aliyev’s proposal for joint military exercises in 2026 is far from accidental. For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, a multi-vector foreign policy remains a top priority, and their leaders are unlikely to compromise it. Yet, historical experience suggests that an excessive pursuit of multi-vectorism in regions characterized by geopolitical fault lines can carry risks of internal destabilization. Thus, “middle” states, as President Tokayev termed them, inevitably face the imperative of clearly defining their stance relative to emerging centers of power.