Tbilisi’s Iron Grip: Opposition Faces Sweeping Bans, West Criticized

In a move that underscores the deepening political chasm in Georgia, President Mikheil Kavelashvili recently issued pardons to 70 convicts in observance of the Mtskhetoba-Svetitskhovloba Christian holiday. Notably absent from the list were any opposition figures, a decision that has fueled concerns regarding the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party’s escalating pressure on its political adversaries. Critics argue that the government has reserved lengthy prison sentences and political oblivion for its opponents, signaling a decisive shift in the nation’s political landscape.

The current climate of heightened tension follows the October 4th anti-government protest, which the Georgian Dream swiftly condemned as an attempted coup d’état. However, this narrative is sharply contested by opposition figures. Tamar Chergoleishvili, leader of the Federalist party, dismissed the coup allegations, describing the situation instead as a “major scandal involving extremely dishonest and irresponsible individuals.” She highlighted the plight of dozens of alleged subversives languishing in prisons without substantive grounds, criticizing the protest’s organizers as ill-prepared and lacking the necessary support for such a significant undertaking.

Chergoleishvili voiced profound skepticism about the prospects of a fair trial for the detained opposition members, predicting politically motivated verdicts. Interestingly, while condemning the regime’s harshness, she conceded that, if in power, she too would penalize protesters, albeit for property damage – a charge carrying lesser penalties – rather than orchestrating a coup. Adding to the self-reflection within the opposition, former President Mikheil Saakashvili, founder of the United National Movement (UNM) and whose allies co-organized the October 4th rally, admitted on social media that the action was poorly executed. Saakashvili, while acknowledging a “miscalculation” in overestimating the speed of regime overthrow, maintained that the UNM was on the correct path towards “full delegitimization of the regime.” He estimated that GD has lost 80% of its legitimacy, yet requires a massive turnout of approximately 500,000 citizens to trigger its collapse in a country with a population of 3.6 million.

Seizing on the coup accusations, the Georgian Dream appears set on a path to dismantle the opposition entirely. Irakli Kirtskhalia, chairman of the GD faction, announced the party’s intention to initiate proceedings in the Constitutional Court to ban the UNM. Kirtskhalia accused the UNM of “racketeering, bloodshed, and dictatorship” during Saakashvili’s presidency, asserting that the party has no place in the republic. Concurrently, the GD is drafting legislation that would prohibit members of banned parties from holding political office, with criminal penalties for any party that subsequently admits such individuals.

Given the UNM’s multiple splits since it ceased to be the ruling party, many of its former members now populate various opposition organizations across Georgia. The government’s broad approach, labeling these groups a “collective national movement,” suggests the ban’s reach could extend far beyond Saakashvili’s original party, potentially neutralizing a significant portion of the opposition camp. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze confirmed this sweeping scope, stating that the injunction would encompass both those associated with the “bloody regime” pre-2012 and individuals who have engaged in “constant sabotage” against the country since then, promising a full list upon official submission to the Constitutional Court.

Political analysts offer contrasting views on the implications. Demur Giorkhelidze believes the ban will not fundamentally alter Georgia’s political landscape, suggesting it fulfills long-held desires of GD voters from 2012. He points out that many current GD lawmakers are former UNM members and dismisses the targeted opposition as “single-celled politicians,” whose October 4th “revolution” was merely a caricature. Conversely, Nika Chitadze views the government’s actions as a strategic attempt to obliterate the entire opposition infrastructure, thereby securing the Georgian Dream’s unchallenged monopoly on power. Chitadze warns that such a move risks depriving Georgia of viable political alternatives, especially considering that the ruling party reportedly commands the support of only about 30% of Georgians nationwide, with its Tbilisi mayoral candidate securing a mere 20% of the vote.

Adding to its domestic consolidation efforts, the Georgian Dream is also tightening regulations on public dissent. New legislation proposes stricter penalties for disobeying law enforcement, with a second offense punishable by up to two years imprisonment. Refusing to disperse from a protest, for instance, could fall under this purview. Simultaneously, Tbilisi has adopted a more confrontational tone towards its Western partners. Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili suggested the European Union is increasingly transforming from a peaceful project into a military one, implicating Brussels in the street conflicts in Tbilisi. Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Bochorishvili, while acknowledging the West’s need for partnership with Georgia, expressed frustration over what she termed the EU’s “childish resentment” and avoidance of dialogue, asserting that Brussels must recognize the geopolitical necessity of Georgia’s role. The US, meanwhile, has reportedly frozen its ‘Friendship Act,’ intended to streamline sanction pressures against Tbilisi, though Georgian authorities continue to await a re-engagement.