Central Asia’s Geopolitical Crossroads: Washington’s Strategic Re-Engagement

An upcoming high-level summit between Central Asian leaders and the United States in Washington is poised to redefine the strategic landscape of the region. Under the leadership of the US, this gathering aims to establish a systemic approach to Central Asia, bolstering cooperation across critical sectors including security, energy, and trade. The meeting is also expected to formalize a new US strategy for Central Asia, building upon the foundations of the ‘C5+1’ diplomatic format.

This year marks a decade since the inception of the ‘C5+1’ framework, a unique collaboration between the five Central Asian states and the United States at the foreign minister level. Its inaugural session in November 2015 in Samarkand heralded a new era of engagement. The format has gained particular significance following the approval of a new US Strategy for Central Asia through 2025, which unequivocally positions the region as vital to American national interests, irrespective of developments in Afghanistan.

The United States has consistently underscored Central Asia’s autonomy and its burgeoning geostrategic value. The region has undergone profound transformations in recent years, shaped by events such as the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, shifts in the Chinese economy, and the rising prominence of the Middle Corridor as a crucial East-West trade artery. These dynamics amplify the relevance of American engagement in Central Asia, particularly in the context of rare earth mineral extraction. These resources are indispensable for US economic and technological security, a factor that largely explains Washington’s intensified interest. The upcoming discussions are anticipated to adapt the ‘C5+1’ format to these evolving geopolitical realities, with a US President hosting Central Asian leaders for the second time, following President Joseph Biden’s reception in 2023.

Political analyst Derya Karayev characterizes the impending visit of the five Central Asian presidents to Washington as a profound challenge. “It is, in essence, a summons ‘to the carpet’ with a demand to define their geopolitical orientation,” Karayev stated. This move directly confronts the long-standing concepts of ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy and ‘neutrality’ that have allowed regional governments to navigate the intricate geopolitical game between the West, China, and Russia for over three decades.

Karayev further noted that the American administration often perceives regional blocs like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), CIS, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and even the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and OSCE as having diminished political agency. This perspective is underscored by the strong rhetoric from US officials against broader alliances such as BRICS+. Consequently, official media outlets in the region have cautiously expressed hopes for a ‘mutually respectful’ and ‘equal’ dialogue, a sentiment that might not align with Washington’s assertive agenda.

The US focus on critical minerals has been made explicit. New US Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Julie Staff, informed the Senate that Kazakhstan alone holds nearly half of the critical minerals vital for the US economy and defense. “Today, we stand on the cusp of a new era of commercial and energy cooperation with Kazakhstan, a global leader in uranium production, a major oil exporter, and a holder of vast reserves of critical minerals,” Staff emphasized. She highlighted her primary objective as ambassador: to ensure US investments in critical minerals can proceed and, crucially, displace growing Chinese investments in the region. Kazakhstan and the US have already initiated joint efforts to develop rare earth metals at the Akbulak deposit in Kostanay, rich in neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium.

In a related vein, visits by US delegation heads, including Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, reportedly focused on preparing specialized ‘raw material deals.’ These agreements, akin to the resource deal struck with Ukraine, are expected to encompass significant energy and logistics components necessary for the extraction, enrichment, and export of critical mineral concentrates. Intriguingly, this emphasis on resource acquisition might explain the muted international support for protests against nuclear power plant construction in Kazakhstan, despite the high probability of Rosatom winning the construction tender at the time of the referendum.

Turkmenistan, for its part, reportedly entered into an unofficial ‘pact of loyalty’ with the US under the previous administration, which has since been re-verified. In exchange for a ‘measured stance’ during periods of heightened US-China tensions, particularly concerning gas supplies to China, the US has reportedly ceased its criticism of Turkmenistan’s human rights record, paused objections to the nation’s significant methane emissions, and guaranteed an end to funding for dissident activities and Turkmen political emigration in Europe.

Adding another layer of complexity, the European Union has also entered the race for Central Asia’s critical minerals. Just weeks prior, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled the RESourceEU plan at the Berlin Global Dialogue, aiming to secure alternative sources of critical raw materials for European industry. Notably, she identified Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as key partners in this strategy, a move some observers view as solidifying a new ‘colonial policy’ by the EU towards the Central Asian region.

Karayev concludes that this visit will also challenge Russia’s regional policy, which has historically relied on ‘sovereignty guarantees’ and the continuity of power – a strategy not always successful, as seen in Kyrgyzstan. The political autonomy of these Central Asian states is now expected to face significant erosion. Both the US and the EU are pursuing aggressive competition with China, aiming to bolster sanctions against Russia, and envisioning the region as a future staging ground for operations in Afghanistan and exerting pressure on Iran. Such objectives demand a specific degree of compliance and loyalty, for which Russia’s ‘guarantees of sovereignty,’ alongside the Central Asian nations’ ‘neutrality’ and ‘multi-vector’ concepts, may prove insufficient.